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2Abstract
This paper seeks to understand labour share dynamics in Europe over the medium run. After
documenting basic empirical regularities, we quantify the contribution of shifts in the sectoral and
the employment composition of the economy to labour share movements. The findings from the
shift-share analysis being on the descriptive side, we next identify the factors underlying labour
share behaviour through a model-based approach. We proceed along the lines of Bentolila and Saint
Paul (2003) but adopt a production function with capital-skill complementarity. We show that labour
share movements are driven by a complex interplay of demand and supply conditions for capital
and different skill categories of labour, the nature of technological progress and imperfect market
structures. Based upon robust calibration, we show that most of the declining pattern in labour
shares in nine EU15 Member States is governed by capital deepening in conjunction with capital-
augmenting technical progress and labour substitution across skill categories. Although institutional
factors also play a significant role, they appear to be of somewhat less importance. To illustrate
the relevance of the technological explanation we quantitatively assess the dynamic impact of a
permanent reduction in the fraction of unskilled employment on the labour share. We find that, for
a given elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour, the more skilled labour is
complementary to capital, the more pronounced the decline in the labour share.
Keywords: labour income share, medium term, two-level CES technology, market institutions.
JEL Classification: E25, J30, L51.
UNDERSTANDING LABOUR INCOME SHARE DYNAMICS IN EUROPE 3
1. Introduction
The functional distribution of income shows how national income is divided among pro-
duction factors. The distribution of increases in output between labour and capital has
occupied the attention of the profession for decades. It has also been a subject of concern
among policy makers and public opinion in recent years, where the observed decline in
the labour share has been associated with important trends, such as globalisation, skilled-
biased technological progress and changes in the institutional settings of labour and prod-
uct markets.
The interplay between increases in output and factor income shares can be looked at
from both the long- and the short-term perspective. The widespread belief among econo-
mists is that labour share movements over these two extreme time horizons can be ne-
glected. On a secular basis, the relative stability of the labour share of income has acquired
the condition of a "stylized fact". Gollin (2002), Gordon (2005), Piketty (2007), Piketty and
Saez (2007), and Zuleta and Young (2007) all document trendless labour shares in the few
countries for which long series are available, i.e. France, the UK and the US. In the con-
text of the growth theory, the constancy of the labour share is associated with models that
possess a steady state. Only when technology is Cobb-Douglas or else the production
function is Constant-Elasticity-of- Substitution (CES) and all technical progress is labour-
augmenting, does the neoclassical growth model deliver the convergence property with
constant labour shares over the long run.
The conventional wisdom that oscillations in the labour share at business-cycle fre-
quencies are irrelevant is more arguable. The increasing body of literature focussing on
labour share movements in the short run proves that there is probably something to it.
Notable pieces of work in the field of cyclical labour share movements for the US are repre-
sented by Young (2004), Hansen and Prescott (2005) and Ríos-Rull and Santaeulàlia-Llopis
(2007).
In between the long- and the short-run there is the medium run, which is the focus
of this paper. The medium run is probably the most relevant period from a policy perspec-
tive, yet the most difficult to deal with from a theoretical angle. Labour share movements
over the medium run are often rationalised in terms of the transitional dynamics of a neo-
classical growth model, which is governed by factor substitution, capital accumulation
and the effect of technological progress, all of them operating at a time. Furthermore, the
assumption of imperfect product and labour markets appears to be the more realistic in
the medium term, which provides additional explanatory power to labour share move-
ments. One should finally bear in mind that worldwide institutional changes, such as the
globalisation process, tend to materialise over several decades.
This paper seeks to understand labour share movements in the former EU15 Mem-
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ber States over the medium run. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 docu-
ments empirical regularities and shows that over the past three decades labour shares
have declined in many European countries. We then proceed to investigate this regular-
ity along two different routes. Firstly, Section 3 analyses structural shifts in a descriptive
manner, by quantifying the contribution of changes in the sectoral and the employment
composition of the economy to labour share movements. The second approach, which we
develop in Section 4, relies on a micro-founded model where the labour share is seen as
a function of both technological and institutional parameters. The model is next used for
calibration and simulation purposes in Section 5. Section 6 concludes with policy implica-
tions.
2. Medium-run empirical regularities
There is a vast literature that documents persistent movements in the labour share over
the medium run. Two such studies focussing on a large number of countries include Har-
rison (2003) and Jones (2003). The evidence presented in this section for EU15 countries is
consistent with this literature.
A very basic way to compute the labour income share simply entails dividing com-
pensation of employees (CEt) by gross value added at current basic prices (GVAt):
LSadt =
CEt
GVAt
(1)
where LSadt is the labour share calculated on the basis of national (i.e. aggregate)
data on employees’ remuneration and value added. The main drawback of expression (1)
is that it ignores the labour income of proprietors. The self-employed typically earn a mix
of capital and labour income, which are not identified separately in the National Accounts
system. There is wide consensus that proprietors’ labour should be remunerated at the
average compensation of wage earners1. This assumption leaves us with the so-called
"adjusted labour share":
ALSadt =
CEt
GVAt
 TEt
Et
(2)
where TEt and Et respectively stand for total employment and employees. Scaling
up the average compensation of wage earners for the entire workforce in the economy is a
good approximation of self-employed labour income to the extent that they command the
1 See Gollin (2002).
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same wage as employees. On the contrary, it is a poor assumption if there are systematic
differences in labour income between employees and the self-employed. In particular, im-
puting the national, as opposed to the sectoral, average compensation to the self-employed
distorts the measure of the labour share (Askenazy, 2003). Equation (2) does overestimate
the income of the self-employed in the 1970s when they were mainly low income farmers
(earning less than the average employee); similarly, it tends to underestimate their income
in recent years as the majority of self-employed are high income earners (earning more
than the average employee). A better estimate may thus be obtained by attributing to the
self-employed the compensation of the average employee of their own activity branch.
This way the national labour share is expressed as a weighted average across sectorally
adjusted labour shares:
ALSsdt =
k
∑
i=1
CEi,t  TEi,t
vai,t  Ei,t =
k
∑
i=1
vai,t
GVAt
 CEi,t
vai,t
 TEi,t
Ei,t
=
k
∑
i=1
ωi,t  alsi,t (3)
where ALSsdt is the national labour share calculated on the basis of sectoral data, so
that, for any sector i, vai,t,ωi,t and alsi,t represent the gross value added at current basic
prices, the sector’s weight in national value added and the adjusted labour share. We argue
in Appendix 1 that expression (3) is preferred to expressions (1) and (2) as a measure of the
labour share. Table 1 and Table 2 report averages, the extreme values and the coefficient of
variation of the labour share computed as in (3), respectively by country and by industry2.
The data are taken from the EU KLEMS database3. The following facts emerge from these
tables:
 In most countries the labour share reaches a maximum in the1970s to early 1980s and a
minimum in the last years of the period. Only in Belgium and Portugal was this share
lower in the 1970s than in the recent past.
 The volatility of the labour share is the highest in Ireland followed by a considerable
distance by Finland, Sweden, Italy, France and Greece4. The labour share is the most
2 Readers should be aware of the fact that descriptive statistics by industry reported in Table 2 exclude the
observations of the labour share that exceed 1. This is the case of Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing in
Austria and Portugal, Construction in Ireland and Hotels and restaurants in Belgium.This is due to the fact that
the correction implied by (2) is not very reliable when the wages of the self-employed and the employees differ
largely.
3 The EU KLEMS database includes measures of economic growth, productivity, employment creation, cap-
ital formation and technological change at the industry level for all European Union member states from 1970
onwards. The balance in academic, statistical and policy input in the EU KLEMS project is realised by the partici-
pation of 15 organisations from across the EU, representing a mix of academic institutions and national economic
policy research institutes and with the support from various statistical offices and the OECD. The project is
funded by the European Commission, Research Directorate.
4 The coefficient of variation in Austria is biased upwards because of a measurment error that arises when
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Table 1   Stylised Facts Of The Labour Share In The Medium Term, Country Perspective
Descriptive statistics by country, EU15 Member States, EU KLEMS data, 1970-2004
Country pp.
change
70-85
pp.
change
86-95
pp.
change
96-04
Mean Maximum (year) Minimum (year) Coef. of
varia-
tion
BE 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.63 0.68 1980 0.58 1970 3.57
DE -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.64 0.68 1981 0.58 2004 4.34
DK -0.02 -0.04 0.01 0.62 0.66 1980 0.58 1994 3.54
EL 0.07 -0.09 -0.02 0.54 0.62 1982 0.48 2004 6.48
ES -0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.60 0.64 1981 0.57 1989 4.16
FI -0.07 -0.07 -0.04 0.62 0.73 1976 0.53 2002 9.73
FR -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.63 0.69 1981 0.57 1998 6.77
IE -0.17 -0.05 -0.07 0.59 0.77 1970 0.44 2002 14.18
IT 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 0.61 0.68 1975 0.53 2001 7.74
LU -0.10 -0.01 0.02 0.55 0.62 1970 0.50 1999 6.32
NL -0.08 0.01 0.00 0.61 0.68 1975 0.56 1985 5.57
AT -0.13 -0.03 -0.06 0.68 0.80 1970 0.58 2004 9.20
PT 0.09 -0.03 0.00 0.62 0.69 1977 0.54 1970 5.62
SW -0.09 -0.04 0.02 0.63 0.71 1977 0.55 1995 7.79
UK -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.67 0.73 1975 0.63 1996 3.43
Source: Own calculations of the basis of EU KLEMS data.
Note: Maximum/minimum: maximum/minimum value of the labour share in pp.
Coefficient of variation: standard deviation of labour share divided by mean, reported as a percentage.
stable in the United Kingdom, Denmark and Belgium.
 The largest pp. declines in the labour share were registered in Ireland, Austria, Luxem-
bourg, Sweden and the Netherlands between 1970 and 1985 andGreece over 1986-1995.
 The labour share ranges on average from 0.39 in Electricity, gas and water supply, to
0.77 in Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing. The fact that the labour share varies
more across industries than countries is suggestive of the importance of technological
differences across industries.
the labour share is computed on the basis of (3). The imputation of the average wage in agriculture to the
self-employed yields a value for the labour share in this industry above one for the overall sample. Given the
relatively high weight of agriculture in the total economy in the early 1970s, the labour share calculated as in (3)
is close to one at the beginning of the sample. This measurement error becomes less important at the end of the
sample, because of the decreasing weight of Agriculture in the total value added.
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Table 2   Stylised Facts Of The Labour Share In The Medium Term, Industry Perspective
Descriptive statistics by industry, EU15 Member States, EU KLEMS data, 1970-2004
Industry Mean Maximum(country) Minimum(country) Coef.
varia-
tion
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 0.77 0.97 DE 0.50 ES 45.52
Mining and quarrying 0.40 0.88 DE 0.07 NL 41.37
Total manufacturing 0.71 0.76 SW/UK 0.51 IE 9.99
Electricity, gas and water supply 0.39 0.56 IE 0.21 SW 22.69
Construction 0.74 0.92 DK 0.41 EL 18.69
Wholesale and retail trade 0.75 0.84 FR 0.55 EL 12.84
Hotels and restaurants 0.76 0.97 DE 0.46 EL 20.36
Transport, storage and communication 0.70 0.80 UK 0.55 FI 9.05
Finance, insurance, real estate
and business services
0.41 0.59 UK 0.25 EL 21.68
Source: Own calculations on the basis of EU KLEMS data.
Note: Max./Min.: maximum/minimum value of the adjusted labour share in pp.
Coefficient of variation: standard deviation of labour share divided by mean, reported as a percentage.
3. A shift-share decomposition of medium-term movements in the
labour share
Thewagemoderation of the last decade has been accompanied by a declining labour share,
giving rise to distributional concerns. However, downward movements in the labour
share may conceal important sectoral and employment developments. To illustrate the
role of changes in the sectoral composition of the economy and in the composition of
employment, this section pursues a shift-share decomposition of the labour share5. The
analysis in this section is in much the same way as in De Serres et al. (2002), who also fo-
cus on the relevance of composition effects in accounting for the evolution of the labour
share over time in OECD countries.
By first-differentiating expression (3), any change in the labour share is split into
three components: i) the sectoral composition effect, which implies that a shift from high- to
low-labour-share sectors will translate into an aggregate decline in the labour share, ce-
teris paribus; ii) the employment structure effect, according to which generalised reductions
in the share of self-employed in total employment across sectors will result in a lower ag-
gregate labour share, ceteris paribus6; and iii) the employees’ remuneration effect, by which
generalised reductions in the ratio of compensation of employees to value added across
sectors lead to a lower aggregate labour share, ceteris paribus. In symbols,
5 For a detailed discussion on the shift-share decomposition of the labour share cfr. European Commission
(2007).
6 Intuitively, a lower share of self-employed in total employment implies, all other things being equal, that a
lower level of compensation per employee is imputed to total employment.
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∆ALSsdt =
k
∑
i=1
CEi,t  TEi,t
vai,t  Ei,t  ∆ωi,t| {z }
Sectoral composition e f f ect
+ ωi,0  TEi,0Ei,0  ∆
CEi,t
vai,t| {z } 
Employees0 remuneration e f f ect
CEi,t
vai,t
 1
qi,t
ωi,t  ∆qi,tqi,0| {z }
Employment structure e f f ect
with qi,t =
Ei,t
TEi,t
. (4)
Figure 1 displays the shift-share decomposition given by (4) for the former EU15
Member States. Notwithstanding the complexity and heterogeneity of labour share move-
ments across countries, it is possible to identify some common patterns in the data:
 Over the period 1970-2004, the sectoral and the employment composition effects both
contributed to a reduction in the aggregate labour share.
 The employees’ remuneration effect has been sizeable during the sub-periods 1970-1985
and 1996-2004. Whether this effect contributed to a downward (due to wage modera-
tion) rather than an upward (due to wage acceleration) movement in the labour share
depends on the country.
The shift-share analysis reveals the importance of structural forces. To illustrate
this more clearly, we construct a counterfactual labour share where the sectoral and the
employment composition are set at their 1970 levels7 (Figure 2). This allows the employees’
remuneration effect to be disentangled from the other two structural sources of labour share
movements. One can see that when the sectoral and the employment composition of the
economy are kept constant, the labour share either remains broadly stable or declines at a
slower pace.
4. Theoretical model
4.1 Static model
This section presents a model to account for labour share movements in the medium term.
The modelling approach is sequential. We start by adopting a two-level CES technololgy
with physical capital, skilled and unskilled labour. We subsequently incorporate interme-
diate inputs to the production function. The specification of the labour share is then mod-
ified to allow for imperfect competition in the goods market and bargaining in the labour
market. Finally, we explore the role of labour hoarding to account for labour share move-
ments. Expression (27) at the end of this section can be regarded as a general specification,
7 For Finland and Luxembourg the sectoral and the employment composition are respectively set at their 1975
and 1985 levels.
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Figure 1: Sources of changes in the labour share in EU15 Member States.
Average annual percentage change.
1970-1985
-1.5%
-1.0%
-0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
BE DE IE EL ES FR IT LU NL AT PT FI DK SE UK
1986-1995
-1.5%
-1.0%
-0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
BE DE IE EL ES FR IT LU NL AT PT FI DK SE UK
1996-2004
-1.5%
-1.0%
-0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
BE DE IE EL ES FR IT LU NL AT PT FI DK SE UK
Sectoral composition Employment composition
Share of employees' remuneration in value added Overall change in the aggregate labour share
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Figure 2: Labour share (expression (3)) versus alternative labour share where
the sectoral and employment composition are set at 1970 levels, EU15Mem-
ber States.
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from which nested versions may be obtained by imposing economically meaningful re-
strictions. Details on algebra are provided in Appendix 2.
A two-level CES technology with labour heterogeneity
Following Sato (1967), let us consider a "two-level CES production technology" with three
inputs, namely, physical capital, skilled labour and unskilled labour. The "first level",
given by a CES composite of physical capital and skilled labour, is nested with unskilled
labour into another CES function, representing the "second level"8. Such an array of pro-
duction possibilities is given by:
Y =
h
αX
σ 1
σ + (1  α) (BuLu)
σ 1
σ
i σ
σ 1
(5)
where
X =

a (AK)
η 1
η + (1  a) (BsLs)
η 1
η
 η
η 1
(6)
In our notation, Y is output, X is the CES composite of physical capital and skilled
labour and K, Ls, Lu stand for physical capital, skilled and unskilled labour. A produc-
tion function such as (5) is characterized by three kinds of parameters: i) distribution
parameters, α and a 2 (0, 1); ii) efficiency parameters, A, Bu and Bs, representing tech-
nical progress specific to each input; and iii) substitution parameters, η and σ, respectively
the elasticity of substitution between physical capital and skilled labour, and the elastic-
ity of substitution between the composite input and unskilled labour9. It is assumed that
0 < η < σ < ∞. 0 < σ < ∞ implies that a reduction in the price of the composite X
relative to unskilled labour will trigger some substitution against unskilled labour. The
assumption η < σ compares the ease of substitution of physical capital to the two skill cat-
egories. It implies higher complementarity (or less substitution) between physical capital
and skilled labour than between the composite capital and unskilled labour. This is the
well-known "capital-skill complementarity" hypothesis10.
8 There is one point worth making in equation (5). Although there are two other possibilities of nesting the
two-level CES function, the specification given by (5) is consistent with the empirical literature. Fallon and
Layard (1975) and Krusell et al. (2000) present evidence in support of (5) and explain why including skilled
labour and capital in the first level is the most plausible variant of nesting.
9 The elasticity of substitution between capital and unskilled labour and between skilled labour and unskilled
labour are both equal to σ.
10 The hypothesis of "capital-skill complementarity" was first formalized by Griliches (1969). A related empir-
ical literature has demonstrated that physical capital and skilled labour have been relatively complementary in
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Under the assumption of perfect competition the labour share is given by:
LSPC =
wPCu Lu + wPCs Ls
Y
=
Y0LuLu +Y
0
LsLs
Y
(7)
where wi and Y0Li , i = u, s, represent the real wage and the marginal productivity
of each type of labour. Substituting in (7) the value added and marginal productivities
consistent with a production function like (5), one can get the following expression for the
labour share (see Appendix 2):
LSPC = 1  a(1  a) (Ak)
ρ
n
αε (1  a)ε 1 + (1  α)ε l ε σσ ωε 1
o σρ
ε(σ 1) (8)
where LSPC denotes the labour share under perfect competition, ρ =
η 1
η and ε =
σρ
σ(ρ 1)+1 . Equation (8) expresses the labour share as a function of k =
K
Y , l =
BsLs
BuLu and
ω =
wPCs
Bs
wPCu
Bu
, which represent the capital-output ratio, the relative supply of skilled labour
and the skill premium, all measured in efficiency units. Expressing the skill premium as
a function of relative factor quantities, one may alternatively obtain the labour share in
terms of input ratios:
LSPC = 1  a (Ak)ρ α
σρ
σ 1
8><>:1+ 1  αα l 1 σσ

a

AK
BsLs
ρ
+ (1  a)
 1 σσρ 9>=>;
σ(ρ 1)+1
σ 1
(9)
Unlike the case of homogeneous labour, where the labour share moves along a sta-
ble (non-linear) relationship with the capital-output ratio (see Bentolila and Saint Paul,
2003), labour heterogeneity introduces a shift factor, which depends on two input ratios:
the relative supply of capital to skilled labour and the relative supply of skilled to unskilled
labour.
the past two centuries and are still so today. Goldin and Katz (1996) show that economy-wide capital and skilled
labour complementarity emerged as a result of the adoption of several crucial technological advances, including
the shift from the factory to continuous-process or batch methods, with electrification and the adoption of unit-
drive machines reinforcing the change through the automation of hauling and conveying operations. Moreover,
capital-skill complementarity is believed to be in full blossom today with ICT developments having a skill-biased
component. Caselli and Coleman (2001) present robust findings that high levels of educational attainment are
important determinants of computer-technology adoption. Krusell et al. (2000) show that capital-skill comple-
mentarity can be the source behind the increase in the US skilled premium. Briefly, empirical research indicates
that new technologies tend to substitute for unskilled labour in the performance of routine tasks, while assisting
skilled workers in executing qualified work.
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The labour share specification given by (9) can be regarded as a general equation
encompassing particular cases for specific values of the elasticities of substitution η and σ.
Table 3 summarizes income shares accruing to the various inputs consistent with (5) for
specific values of the elasticities of substitution η and σ. All income shares (θLu, θX , θL, θK, θLs)
are expressed as a function of relative factor quantities AKBuLu ,
AK
BsLs , l.
The main observation to emerge from this table is that the relative supply of pro-
duction factors affects income shares as long as the technology is different from Cobb-
Douglas. Under case 1, both the inter- and intra-class elasticities of substitution are equal
to one (σ = η = 1), thus all income shares are constant and given by the distribution pa-
rameters α and a. Under case 2, the elasticity between groups is equal to one (σ = 1) and
the elasticity within groups is lower than one (η < 1),implying complementarity between
capital and skilled labour. Consequently, the shares of the composite input and unskilled
labour are determined by α.The remaining shares θL, θK and θLu (which imply a separa-
tion of the factors within the composite) all depend on the ratios BsLsAK and
BuLu
AK through
η.Under case 3, σ > 1, which explains why both AKBuLu and
BsLs
BuLu play a role in the division
of income between the composite input and unskilled labour. Furthermore, because sub-
stitution of capital to skilled labour is as in Cobb-Douglas (η = 1), the labour share is only
influenced by changes in the relative supply of unskilled labour BuLuBsLs (in a magnitude that
depends of 1 αα and σ).Finally, under the general case σ > η, one can see that the labour
share is influenced by all three ratios AKBuLu ,
AK
BsLs , l, the two distribution parameters α and a
and the two elasticities of substitution σ and ρ.
To further illustrate the implications of changes in relative factor quantities, it is
convenient to express the labour share in the following way:
LSPC = θLu

1+
wPCs
wPCu
Ls
Lu

(10)
where θLu =
wPCu Lu
Y is the income share of unskilled labour. Note that expression (10)
implies that the labour share is a function of relative wages, with the result that an increase
inwage inequality raises the labour share. We show inAppendix 3 that θLu = θLu

AK
BuLu , l

and that w
PC
s
wPCu
= w
PC
s
wPCu

AK
BuLu ,
AK
BsLs , l

, meaning that the labour share can be expressed as a
sole function of input ratios11. Comparative static results are as follows (see Appendix 3).
11 Equation (9) expresses the labour share as a function of the relative supply of skilled labour, the capital-
output ratio and the wage premium. Since the latter two variables can in turn be expressed as a function of
relative factor quantities, it suffices to focus on these ratios to see the implications of the model for the labour
share.
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All other things being equal:
 The labour share responds positively to an increase in the capital to skilled labour ratio
provided there is some substitution between capital and skilled labour, i.e. ∂LSPC
∂( AKBsLs )
> 0
if and only if η > 0, which always holds, as η is strictly positive for all admissible val-
ues. With capital-skill complementarity, an increase in equipment per skilled worker
increases the relative demand of qualified labour, thus leading to an increase in the
wage premium (decreasing with η). In the new equilibrium, the income share of un-
skilled labour will remain unchanged while a larger number of skilled workers will
be employed at a higher wage. Thus, the share of income accruing to labour will be
higher.
 The labour share responds negatively to an increase in the relative supply of skilled
workers if skilled and unskilled labour are highly substitutive, i.e. ∂LSPC
∂( LsLu )
< 0 if σ > 1.
An increase in LsLu creates an excess of supply of qualified workers and a reduction
in their relative wage. The higher σ, the more unskilled workers will be replaced by
skilled labour in production and the sharper the fall in the unskilled’s income share.
Comparedwith the initial state of the economy, the relative demand for skilled workers
will be higher, and both the labour share of the unskilled and the wage premium will
be lower. If σ > 1, the overall effect on the labour share will be negative.
 Similarly, the labour share responds negatively to an increase in the capital to unskilled
labour ratio if capital and unskilled labour are highly substitutive, i.e. ∂LSPC
∂( AKBuLu )
< 0 if and
only if σ > 1. An increase in AKBuLu creates an excess of supply of equipment and a reduc-
tion in the price of capital in terms of unskilled labour. The substitution in production
of capital for unskilled labour implies a reduction in the unskilled share in total income
(increasing with σ). With capital-skill complementarity, the relative demand for skilled
workers rises, which increases the wage premium. In the new equilibrium, both the rel-
ative demand for qualified labour and its relative price will be higher, while the labour
income share of the unskilled will be lower. If σ > 1, the latter effect predominates and
the labour share will decrease following a positive shock to capital.
 A sufficient condition for capital-augmenting technical progress to push the labour
share downwards is that 1 < η < σ, i.e. ∂LSPC∂A < 0 if 1 < η < σ.
Briefly, a technology with capital-skill complementarity like (5) can account for
episodes where declining labour shares are accompanied by (some or all of) the following
phenomena: i) capital-augmenting technical progress; ii) a reduction in the capital-skilled
labour ratio, iii) unskilled labour becomes relatively scarce with respect to capital and/or
skilled labour.
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Table 3   Factor Shares For Specific Values Of The Elasticities Of Substitution σ and η
Case 1 Case 2
σ = 1; η = 1 (ρ = 0) σ = 1; η < 1 (ρ < 0)
θLu 1  α 1  α
θX α α
θL 1  αa 1 a (Ak)ρ= 1  a(AK)
ρ
Xα(BuLu)1 α
= 1 
 
a 1
a+(1 a)( BsLsAK )
ρ
α
( BuLuAK )
ρ(1 α)
!
θK αa a (Ak)
ρ = a(AK)
ρ
Xα(BuLu)1 α
= a 1
a+(1 a)( BsLsAK )
ρ
α
( BuLuAK )
ρ(1 α)
θLs (1  a) α α  a (Ak)ρ= α  a(AK)
ρ
Xα(BuLu)1 α
= α 
 
a 1
a+(1 a)( BsLsAK )
ρ
α
( BuLuAK )
ρ(1 α)
!
Note: Production function isY = (AK)aα (BsLs)(
1 a)α (BuLu)1 α in Case 1,
and Y =

a (AK)ρ + (1  a) (BsLs)ρ
 1
ρ
α
(BuLu)
1 α in Case 2.
A three-level CES technology with intermediate inputs
This section shows that the fraction of value added absorbed by labour is affected by
changes in the relative price of intermediate inputs, which enter as an additional scal-
ing factor in the relationship between the labour share and the capital output ratio. To see
this formally, let us adopt the following CES production function for gross output (eY):
eY =
8<:γ
h
αX
σ 1
σ + (1  α) (BuLu)
σ 1
σ
i σ
σ 1
 λ 1
λ
+ (1  γ) I λ 1λ
9=;
λ
λ 1
(11)
where the capital-labour composite is now nested with intermediate inputs into a
"third level" CES aggregator. I stands for intermediate inputs, 0 < γ < 1 is a distribution
parameter and 0 < λ < ∞ determines the elasticity of substitution between intermediate
inputs and the aggregator of primary inputs. Real value added is defined as (see Bruno
and Sachs 1985, ch. 2, for a discussion):
Y = eY  pIep I (12)
where ep and pI respectively denote the price deflators of gross output and the in-
termediate inputs, so pIep represents the real price of intermediate inputs in terms of gross
output. We show in Appendix 2 that optimising behaviour by firms implies the following
expression of the labour share:
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Table 3 (cont.)   Factor Shares For Specific Values Of The Elasticities Of Substitution σ and η
Case 3 Case 4 (general case)
σ > 1; η = 1 (ρ = 0) σ > η
θLu
1
1+ α1 α
h
( AKBuLu )
a
( BsLsBuLu )
1 ai σ 1σ (1  α)

BuLu
Y
 σ 1
σ
=
= 1
1+ α1 α
h
a( AKBuLu )
ρ
+(1 a)( BsLsBuLu )
ρ
i σ 1
σρ
θX 1  1
1+ α1 α
h
( AKBuLu )
a
( BsLsBuLu )
1 ai σ 1σ α

X
Y
 σ 1σ
=
=1 
0BB@ 1
1+
 
α
1 α
h
a( AKBuLu )
ρ
+(1 a)( BsLsBuLu )
ρ
i σ 1
σρ
!
1CCA
θL 1  a
1+ 1 αα (
BuLu
BsLs )
σ 1
σ
1  a (Ak)ρ α

Y
X
 σ(ρ 1)+1
σ
=
=1  a (Ak)ρ α σρσ 1
8<:1+ 1 αα  BuLuBsLs  σ 1σ ha  AKBsLs ρ + (1  a)i
1 σ
σρ
9=;
σ(ρ 1)+1
σ 1
where (Ak)ρ = 1"
α

a+(1 a)( BsLsAK )
ρ
 σ 1
σρ
+(1 α)( BuLuAK )
σ 1
σ
# σρ
σ 1
θK
a
1+ 1 αα (
BuLu
BsLs )
σ 1
σ
a (Ak)ρ α

Y
X
 σ(ρ 1)+1
σ
=
=a (Ak)ρ α
σρ
σ 1
8<:1+ 1 αα  BuLuBsLs  σ 1σ ha  AKBsLs ρ + (1  a)i
1 σ
σρ
9=;
σ(ρ 1)+1
σ 1
where (Ak)ρ = 1"
α

a+(1 a)( BsLsAK )
ρ
 σ 1
σρ
+(1 α)( BuLuAK )
σ 1
σ
# σρ
σ 1
θLs 1  a
1+ 1 αα (
BuLu
BsLs )
σ 1
σ
  θL θLu= θX θK
1
1+ α1 α
h
( AKBuLu )
a
( BsLsBuLu )
1 ai σ 1σ
Note: Production function isY =

α
h
(AK)a (BsLs)
1 ai σ 1σ + (1  α) (BuLu) σ 1σ  σσ 1 in Case 3,
andY =

α

a (AK)ρ + (1  a) (BsLs)ρ
 σ 1
σρ + (1  α) (BuLu)
σ 1
σ
 σ
σ 1
in Case 4.
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LSPC,I = 1 Ωa (Ak)ρ α
σρ
σ 1
8><>:1+ 1  αα l 1 σσ

a

AK
BsLs
ρ
+ (1  a)
 1 σσρ 9>=>;
σ(ρ 1)+1
σ 1
(13)
whereΩ = γ
λ
λ 12641  (1 γ)λ
pIep
λ 1
375
1
λ 1
and LSPC,I denotes the labour share under perfect com-
petition and a production function that incorporates intermediate inputs. To interpret the
effect of Ω on the labour share, it is convenient to bear in mind that equilibrium value
added can be expressed as a function of Ω and the CES composite of primary inputs (see
Appendix 3):
Y = Ω
h
αX
σ 1
σ + (1  α) (BuLu)
σ 1
σ
i σ
σ 1
(14)
Expression (14) defines the value added in the presence of intermediate inputs. One
can see that if γ = 1, then Ω = 1, and the value added and the labour share are respec-
tively given by expressions (5) and (9), i.e. we are back to the case where there are no
intermediate inputs (see case 4 in Table 3). By contrast, as γ ! 0, then Ω ! 0, and the
value added gets smaller. Amongst other things, this implies that a policy encouraging
the adoption of new energy-saving technologies (i.e. an increase in the value of γ) raises
value added. This policy can thus be seen as a win-win strategy for it generates a higher
labour share with no detriment to the capital share.
Appendix 3 shows that, everything else being equal, ∂LSPC,I
∂

pIep
 > 0. Thus, an increase
in the relative price of intermediate inputs raises the labour share unambiguously. This
is due to the capital-skill complementarity hypothesis, which implies that there is higher
complementarity (or less substitution) between physical capital and intermediate inputs
than between aggregate labour and intermediate inputs. This means that, all other things
being equal, an increase in the price of intermediate inputs increases the demand for labour
relative to capital, raising relative wages and pushing up the labour share.
Market conditions
This section departs from the perfectly competitive framework by assuming that firms
operate in a monopolistic product market and that there is bargaining over wages and
employment in the labour market. The connection between real wages and the marginal
UNDERSTANDING LABOUR INCOME SHARE DYNAMICS IN EUROPE 18
productivity of labour is therefore broken, which provides additional explanatory power
to account for medium-term labour share movements.
IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN THE PRODUCTS MARKET
Under perfect competition, the labour share is the product of the marginal produc-
tivity of labour times the inverse of the average productivity of labour, i.e. the share of
value added accruing to labour is (technologically) determined by the employment elas-
ticity of output. Imperfect competition in the products market drives a wedge between
the marginal product of labour and the real wage given by the mark-up, which is one
institutional variable affecting the labour share.
Under imperfect competition, firms set prices over marginal costs in the following
way:
p = (1+ µ)mc = (1+ µ)
Wi
Y0Li
, i = u, s (15)
where p,MC and µ respectively denote the value added deflator and the firm’s mar-
ginal costs and mark-up. Wi and Y
0
Li represent the nominal wage and marginal productiv-
ity of each type of labour. Working out the real wage wi =
Wi
p as a function of the mark-up
one gets the labour share under imperfect competition:
LSIC =
1
(1+ µ)
Y0LuLu +Y
0
LsLs
Y
(16)
Under imperfect competition, the labour share is situated below its level in perfect
competition. As indicated by equation (16), non-competitive firms are willing to pay a
lower level of real wage for any given level of employment, i.e. the labour demand shifts
leftwards (in a magnitude that depends on the mark-up) and crosses the labour supply for
lower levels of employment and the real wage.
If the production function is given by (11), one may combine (13) with (16) to obtain
the following expression for the labour share (see Appendix 2):
LSIC,I =
1
(1+ µ)
0BBB@1 Ωa (Ak)ρ α σρσ 1
8><>:1+ 1  αα l 1 σσ

a

AK
BsLs
ρ
+ (1  a)
 1 σσρ 9>=>;
σ(ρ 1)+1
σ 1
1CCCA
(17)
where LSIC,I denotes the labour share under imperfect competition and a produc-
tion function that incorporates intermediate inputs. Equation (17) indicates that, ceteris
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paribus, the labour share is a decreasing function of the mark-up.
BARGAINING IN THE LABOUR MARKET
Bargaining in the labour market leads to a different pattern of real wages and em-
ployment than under perfect competition. Bargaining can take place along two dimen-
sions, according to whether the firm retains the right to manage employment. In the
"right-to-manage" model, the firm and the union first bargain over the real wage, and
then employment is chosen by the firm unilaterally so as to maximize profits (i.e. the firm
chooses a point on the labour demand curve). As pointed out by Leontief (1947), this so-
lution is not efficient in that either the union and/or the firm could be made better off by
bargaining over employment as well as wages (the so-called "efficient bargaining").
It is often argued that wages and employment are not determined in the same way
in the skilled and unskilled labour markets. In this work, we assume that the market
of skilled labour is perfectly competitive, as alternative ways of modelling it (including,
e.g., the efficiency wage model or the search paradigm) would introduce greater complex-
ity without affecting the basic results. By contrast, the unskilled wage and employment
levels are supposed to be determined in an efficient bargaining fashion. This modelling
choice is driven by two considerations. First, unskilled workers are more likely to be cov-
ered by union agreements than skilled workers, since they represent the bulk of unions’
membership (see Acemoglu et al. 2001). Second, our choice is motivated by the need to
have a framework in which the unskilled workers’ bargaining power, their wages and em-
ployment levels all move in the same direction over time. The past three decades have
been characterised by a decline in the share of unskilled labour, a fall in their wages rela-
tive to skilled and, most likely, a reduction in their bargaining power. Efficient bargaining
delivers this result, because of the positive slope of the contract curve1213.
Under efficient bargaining for unskilled labour, the union and the firm jointly de-
termine Wu and Lu. This corresponds to the solution of the following Nash bargaining
problem14:
12 As Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) put it: "Why assume efficient bargaining? First, it seems like a natural
assumption in this context. But also, we want to capture the possibility that firms may not be operating on their
demand for labour. In more informal terms, we want to allow for the fact that, when there are rents, stronger
workers may be able to obtain a higher wage without suffering a decrease in employment, at least in the short
run. Efficient bargaining naturally delivers that implication".
13 Note also that modelling wage bargaining for the unskilled according to a right-to-manage paradigm would
leave unaffected any of the expressions for the labour share discussed so far. This is because, like in the com-
petitive labour market case, the equilibrium position for real wages and employment under the right-to-manage
approach still lies on the labour demand, so, in that regard, changes in the bargaining power of workers affect
the labour share thorough variations in the {real wage, employment} equilibrium along the labour demand curve
(see Bentolila and Saint Paul, 2003 p. 14 for details).
14 It is worthwhile noting that the net gain to the firm from reaching the bargain is defined in (18) in terms of
nominal output and nominal wages. This is because in (18) one derives not only with respect to wages, but also
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max
Wu ,Lu

Lu
Tu
[U (Wu) U (RWu)]
β 
P (Y)Y
 
K, Ls, Lu
 WuLu  WsLs	1 β (18)
where Lu, Tu,U(.),Wu,RWu, P(Y),Y,and β all refer to unskilled workers and re-
spectively stand for employed union members, total union members, the representative
worker utility, nominal wages, the reservation wage, the inverse of the demand curve
faced by any (imperfectly competitive) firm, the firm’s value added and the union’s bar-
gaining power. The bar symbol over a variable is used to indicate that this is taken as given
when negotiating over Wu and Lu. Note that the firm’s surplus is defined in such a way
that if the union has all the bargaining power, unskilled workers will absorb any surplus
that remains after remunerating the skilled by their marginal productivity, i.e. the labour
share is equal to 1 under β = 1.
The equilibrium is characterised by the following two equations:
Y0Lu
(1+ µ)
  wu,IC,EB =   [U (wu,IC,EB) U (RWu)]U0 (wu,IC,EB) (19)

Wu
P

IC,EB
= wu,IC,EB = β

Y  wsLs
Lu

+ (1  β) Y
0
Lu
(1+ µ)
(20)
where ws,wu,IC,EB respectively stand for skilled workers’ real wages (implied by
expression (15)) and unskilled workers’ real wages under efficient bargaining. Equation
(19) is the "contract curve". It states that an efficient wage and employment outcome is
one where the slopes of the isoprofit curve and the indifference curve are the same15. The
contract curve starts at the competitive equilibrium (under wu,IC,EB = RWu) and generally
lies to the right of the labour demand curve (for any wu,IC,EB > RWu). This implies that the
value of the marginal product of labour is generally less than the real wage by an amount
which is equal to the union marginal rate of substitution of employment for wages. It
can also be shown that the contract curve is upward sloping. Intuitively, as wages are
increased above the competitive level (β > 0), any members who are laid off have an
increasing opportunity cost of being unemployed. The union therefore insures members
with respect to employment. As an imperfectly competitive firm faces a downward-sloping curve, one is then
obliged to consider the reduction in prices arising from a marginal increase in employment.
15 Efficiency means that the marginal rates of substitution of employment for wages, for both the union and the
firm, are equal.
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Figure 3: Labour market outcomes for unskilled labour under efficient bargaining.
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EBICuw ,,
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wu
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MPL/(1+μ): marginal product of
unskilled labour
Max
EBICuw ,, β = 1
against this risk by bargaining for increased employment16.
The specific point of the contract curve chosen depends on the relative bargaining
power of the firm and of the union, as indicated by the "rent division curve" (20). If the
union has no power (β = 0), the rent division curve collapses to the marginal product of
labour (corrected for the mark-up), i.e.

Wu
P

IC,EB
=
Y0Lu
(1+µ) , the outcome under perfect
competition. If the firm has no power (β = 1), the rent division curve becomes the average
product of labour net of the skilled workers’ wage bill, i.e.

Wu
P

IC,EB
= Y wsLsLu . The
equilibrium outcome is illustrated in Figure 3, where the efficient wage and employment
levels are given by the intersection of the rent division curve and the contract curve.
Substituting the real wage according to (20) into the definition of the labour share
given by (16), one gets:
LSIC,EB = β+

1  β
1+ µ
"Y0LuLu +Y0LsLs
Y
#
(21)
By comparing equations (16) and (21) it can be seen that, under efficient bargaining
15 For a formal proof see, for instance, Booth (1995), p. 130.
16 This reasoning assumes that union’s members are risk-averse, that is U0 (w) > 0 and U00 (w) > 0, which
is the relevant empirical case for unskilled workers. If members were risk-neutral, the contract curve would be
vertical; members are not offered insurance against the risk of being unemployed. If members were risk-loving,
the contract curve would be negatively sloped.
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in the labour market, the labour share will be generally higher when compared to a situa-
tion where no bargaining power is allocated to unskilled workers. The labour share given
by (21) ranges between its value provided by equation (16) (if β = 0, i.e. all bargaining
power is allocated to firms) and 1 (if β = 1, i.e. all bargaining power rests with unskilled
workers).
If the production function for gross output is given by (11), then one can get the
following expression for the labour share:
LSIC,I,EB = β+

1  β
1+ µ
0BBB@
1 Ωa (Ak)ρ α σρσ 18<:1+ 1 αα l 1 σσ ha  AKBsLs ρ + (1  a)i
1 σ
σρ
9=;
σ(ρ 1)+1
σ 1
1CCCA (22)
where LSIC,I,EB is the labour share with firms operating under imperfect competi-
tion, varying price of intermediate inputs, perfect competition in the skilled labour market
and efficient bargaining in the unskilled labour market. From (22), one can obtain the
partial derivative of the labour share with respect to β, which is equal to:
∂LSIC,I,EB
∂β
= 1  1
1+ µ
0BBB@
1 Ωa (Ak)ρ α σρσ 18<:1+ 1 αα l 1 σσ ha  AKBsLs ρ + (1  a)i
1 σ
σρ
9=;
σ(ρ 1)+1
σ 1
1CCCA
Given that µ > 0 and that the term in brackets is strictly below 1, it always follows
that ∂LSIC,I,EB∂β > 0. The rationale behind this result is as follows. In the right-to-manage
model, a higher level of β would imply a decline in the demand for unskilled workers (in-
creasing with sigma) as firms substitute human and physical capital for unskilled labour.
However bargaining solely over wages is Pareto-inefficient. With efficient bargaining and
risk adverse individuals, the slope of the contract curve is positive, i.e. the efficient al-
location from the point of view of the bargainers implies that employment is rising with
wages. This is because as wages are increased above the competitive level, those that are
laid off have an increasing opportunity cost of being unemployed (i.e. the newly unem-
ployed cannot enjoy higher negotiated wages). Thus, the union insures against this risk by
bargaining for increased employment. The tougher unions representing unskilled work-
ers are at the bargainnig table (i.e. the higher β) the lower the increase in the wages and
the higher the increase in employment (i.e. the contract curve defined in the {real wage,
employment} space flattens as β increases). This is associated with a higher labour share.
ADJUSTMENT COSTS
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This section explores the implications for the labour share of labour hoarding. Labour
hoarding is to a large extent determined by adjustment costs (such as firing and hiring re-
strictions, search and training costs), which affect the behaviour of employment in two
ways:
 Hiring and firing restrictions reduce the fluctuations of employment, as they induce
less hiring when demand is expanding and less firing when it is contracting.
 If adjustment costs are convex in the change in employment, they result in a gradual
distribution over time of any given magnitude of the change in employment, which
rationalizes a lagged response of employment to changes in output.
This means that, even if the technology is Cobb-Douglas, the labour share will fluc-
tuate along the business cycle (see Kessing, 2001). With a more general CES production
function, adjustment costs ought to exacerbate labour share’s fluctuations, as variations in
labour productivity will be more pronounced in presence of labour hoarding.
For ease of analysis, adjustment costs have most often been represented using a con-
vex symmetric function. However, a growing body of empirical literature has rejected the
hypothesis of symmetric adjustment in favour of some form of asymmetry (see a compre-
hensive review of the literature in Hamermesh and Pfann, 1996, Table 1, p. 1280). This has
led Pfann and Palm (1993) to assume a general specification for adjustment costs of the
form:
AC (4L) =  1+ eφ4L   φ4 L+ χ
2
(4L)2 with φ unrestricted and χ > 0 (23)
Parameters χ and φ characterize the adjustment cost function (23). χ > 0 implies
that adjustment costs are a convex function of the quantity of labour, i.e. AC0 (4L) >
0, AC00 (4L) > 0. φ defines the type of asymmetric adjustment with symmetry implied by
φ = 0 and φ > 0(φ < 0) representing a situation where the marginal cost of an increase in
employment is greater (smaller) than that of a reduction.
In the presence of adjustment costs for both skilled and unskilled employment, the
equilibrium in the labour market is characterized by the following expressions:

WS
P

IC,ac
= ws,IC,AC =
Y0Ls   AC0 (4Ls)
(1+ µ)
(24)
Y0Lu   AC0 (4Lu)
(1+ µ)
  wu,IC,EB,AC =   [U (wu,IC,EB,AC) U (RWu)]U0 (wu,IC,EB,AC) (25)
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
Wu
P

IC,EB,AC
= wu,IC,EB,AC = β
 
Y  ws,IC,ACLs
Lu
!
+ (1  β) Y
0
Lu   AC0 (4Lu)
(1+ µ)
(26)
where ws,IC,AC and wu,IC,EB,AC are the real wages for skilled and unskilled work-
ers in the presence of adjustment costs, imperfect competition in the products market and
efficient bargaining in the unskilled labour market. The bar symbol over ws,IC,AC in ex-
pression (26) indicates that the skilled workers’ real wage (implied by expression (24)) is
taken as given when bargaining. Expressions (24), (25) and (26) only differ from the origi-
nal versions (15), (19) and (20) in the marginal costs of adjustment. The modified contract
curve (25) implies that the firm will be more reluctant to hire new workers during expan-
sions in the presence of adjustment costs. The new solution for the real wage (26) shows
that the firm’s threat point (i.e. wages under β = 0) is given by the marginal product of
unskilled labour minus its marginal adjustment cost. Thus, in the presence of adjustment
costs, the firm will be willing to pay lower wages for any given level of employment.
To proceed further, it is worth noting that only labour-consuming adjustment costs
should be included in the labour share17. In what follows it is assumed that all adjustment
costs use labour18. Accordingly, the labour share is augmented with the remuneration to
the labour services that facilitate incorporating additional employment into the firm. If
the production function for gross output is given by (11), then one can get the following
expression for the labour share:
LSIC,I,EB,AC = β+

1  β
1+ µ

0BBBBBB@
1 Ωa (Ak)ρ α σρσ 18<:1+ 1 αα l 1 σσ ha  AKBsLs ρ + (1  a)i
1 σ
σρ
9=;
σ(ρ 1)+1
σ 1
1
(1 β)
AC0(4Ls)Ls
Y   AC
0(4Lu)Lu
Y
1CCCCCCA
+
AC (4Ls) + AC (4Lu)
Y
(27)
Adjustment costs have two effects on the labour share. First, adjustment costs in-
fluence firms’ demand for labour and the equilibrium real wage (see eq. 24, 25 and 26).
For the given average employment level, the firm’s marginal costs are higher when the
17 One may distinguish adjustment costs that consume labour or that take the form of a firm’s payments to the
worker (e.g. severance payments, training costs, recruitment services provided by an employment agency) from
costs related neither directly nor indirectly to labour.
18 On empirical grounds adjustment costs are a negligible share of income. Thus, including average adjustment
costs in expression (27) eventually makes no difference to the level of the labour share and its dynamics.
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employment adjustment is costly, which implies a lower wage share. Second, labour in-
come comprises income from work and a monetary transfer corresponding to the value of
the insurance against unstable employment provided by the adjustment costs. Thus ad-
justment costs raise the labour share as long as they are equivalent to such payments to
workers.
4.2 Dynamic model
In this section we investigate the dynamic behaviour of the labour share within the Solow
growth model. Let us consider the following two-level CES production technology:
Yt = Bt
264α a (Kt) η 1η + (1  a) (Ls) η 1η  ηη 1!
σ 1
σ
+ (1  α) (BuLu)
σ 1
σ
375
σ
σ 1
(28)
and the associated labour share:
LSPC,t = 1  a (kt)ρ α
σρ
σ 1
8><>:1+ 1  αα l 1 σσt

a

Kt
Ls,t
ρ
+ (1  a)
 1 σσρ 9>=>;
σ(ρ 1)+1
σ 1
(29)
The only difference between equations (28) and (29) and (5) and (9) is in the speci-
fication of technical progress, which is now assumed to be purely labour-augmenting (i.e.
Harrod neutral). This is needed for the neoclassical growth model to deliver a steady
state solution, thus consistent with the observation that shares of value added accruing to
labour show no secular trend.
Let s, δ, n be the (exogenously given) savings rate, the depreciation rate and the
population growth rate, respectively. Technical progress is Harrod-neutral and grows at
the exogenous rate g. In transitional dynamics, skilled labour is assumed to grow faster
than total population nu,t, which yields an increasing fraction of skilled labour over time,
(1  ut).
The dynamics of the labour share is determined by the behaviour of the key ratios
kt = KtYt , lt =
Ls,t
Lu,t and
Kt
Ls,t as given by equations (30) to (33):
lt =
Ls,t
Lu,t
=
Ls,t
Nt
Lu,t
Nt
=
1  ut
ut
(30)
UNDERSTANDING LABOUR INCOME SHARE DYNAMICS IN EUROPE 26
ut = u0etnu,t where nu,t < n and limt!∞nu,t = n (31)
Kt
Ls,t
=
Kt
Nt
Ls,t
Nt
=
(1+ g)
h
s Yt 1Nt 1 + (1  n  δ  g)
Kt 1
Nt 1
i
1  ut (32)
kt =
Kt
Yt
=
Kt
Nt
Yt
Nt
=
(1+ g)
h
s Yt 1Nt 1 + (1  n  δ  g)
Kt 1
Nt 1
i
B
24α ha  KtNt ρ + (1  a) (1  ut)ρi
σ 1
σρ
+ (1  α) u
σ 1
σ
t
35 σσ 1
(33)
The steady state of the key ratios, denoted with (*), is defined by the following
conditions:
l =

Ls
Lu

=

Ls
N


Lu
N
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Papageorgiou and Saam (2005) establish the existence and stability conditions in
the Solow model within the framework of a two-level CES like (28). They show that when
both σ and η are positive, a unique and stable steady state

K
N

> 0 exists if and only if
Bα
σ
σ 1 a
η
η 1 < n+δs .
5. Model calibration and simulation
5.1 Model calibration
For calibration purposes we build on the static version described under Section 4.1. Cal-
ibration is country-specific, in that both data and parameter values vary depending on
the country. Further, the choice of the best specification for the labour share (among the
several versions discussed under Section 4.1) may differ across countries.
The model is calibrated to nine EU15Member States, namely Austria, Belgium, Ger-
many, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The calibration
matches average values for 1970-200419. The key ratios kt = KtYt , lt =
Ls,t
Lu,t and
Kt
Ls,t rely on
the following sources. Capital stock corresponds to the variable "real fixed capital stock
at 1995 prices, all assets" in the EU KLEMS database, except for Belgium, where capital
is taken from the OECD STAN database. The remaining variables are EU KLEMS series.
Value added is "gross value added at current basic prices", skilled and unskilled labour are
respectively made equal to high-skilled and medium- plus low-skilled workers as defined
in the EU KLEMS database. For each level of qualification, the number of hours worked
is the product of the share in total hours worked per each skill category and total hours
worked by persons engaged. Hours worked per skill category are then divided by hours
worked per employee to obtain labour in headcounts.
The paths for capital and labour-augmenting technical progress are consistent with
Klump et al. (2007) (see Table 4 in p.108 of the referred paper), which is one recent work
attempting to quantify biased technological progress in the euro area over the period 1970-
2003, i.e. the same period and country coverage adopted in this paper. Their estimates im-
ply that labour-augmenting is higher than capital-augmenting technical progress at any
time, that capital-augmenting technical progress vanishes in the limit and that labour-
augmenting technical progress approaches around 0.6% in the very long run 20. For con-
19 The calibration periods, which slightly differ across the countries, are as follows: 1971-2004 for Italy and
the UK, 1974-2004 for Finland, 1980-2004 for Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France and Austria, and 1991-2004 for
Germany.
20 One caveat in our use of such estimates is that we implicitly assume that labour-augmenting technical
progress is the same for both skilled and unskilled labour, as technology in Klump et al. (2007) is one-level
CES in capital and aggregate labour.
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venience, the level of capital-augmenting technical progress is scaled tomatch the observed
labour share in the first year of the calibration period for each country.
The evolution of mark-ups over time is consistent with the evidence reported in
McAdam and Willman (2004b)21.
Calibration starts by setting the value of the distribution parameters, a, α, and γ. γ
matches the weight of value added in gross output. Pinning down α and a requires choos-
ing a value for the elasticity of substitution between the capital-skilled labour composite
and unskilled labour, σ. This value has been set for most countries at 1.5, as in Krusell
et al. (2000). It is then possible to choose α to match the average labour share of the un-
skilled over the calibration period. Given α, it is straightforward to obtain a, as the sum of
all shares equals one.
With the data and values for distribution parameters described above the calibra-
tion strategy for each country goes from the most specific (i.e. expression (9)) to the most
general case (i.e. expression (27)). This way, it is possible to determine the main drivers
underlying labour share movements in each country, including technological progress,
changes in the relative price of intermediate inputs, mark-ups, the unskilled workers’ bar-
gaining power and adjustment costs in employment. For each country, the values for the
technological parameters σ, η and λ, and for the parameters defining the adjustment cost
function ϕ and χ are in line with the existing empirical evidence. Specifically, the cali-
brated values of η fall within the range of values surveyed in Hamermesh (1993a) (chapter
3). Chosen values for λ closely follow those estimated by Saito (2004). The parameters
ϕ and χ are consistent with those predicated by the literature on asymmetric adjustment
costs in employment, as argued further below.
Leaving aside country-specific features, there seems to be a common story to the ex-
planation of medium-term labour share movements in European countries (Figure 4). The
driving force behind the observed downward trend is technology. Given the characteris-
tics of the production function, there are various channels through which the labour share
is affected along the transitional dynamics (i.e. the medium term). These channels are as
follows:
 with capital-skill complementarity (σ > η), capital-augmenting technical progress pushes
the labour share downwards;
 with high substitution between skilled and unskilled labour (σ > 1), the labour share
responds negatively to the historical increase in the relative supply of skilled labour;
21 Their theoretical framework contains a multi-sector model of imperfect competition. By allowing price and
income elasticities to differ across sectors, the aggregation of the profit maximisation implies that the aggregate
mark-up increases over time due to sectoral shifts in the economy, even though the mark-up in each sector
remains constant. Specifically, the upward trend in the mark-up reflects an increasing weight of sectors with
high mark-ups (e.g. services) to the detriment of those with low mark-ups (e.g. manufacturing).
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 with high substitution between capital and unskilled labour (σ > 1), the labour share
responds negatively to the historical increase in the capital to unskilled labour ratio;
 with η > 0 the labour share responds negatively to the historical fall in the capital to
skilled labour ratio22.
The only two countries that do not follow this general pattern are the United King-
dom and Denmark. The United Kingdom conforms fairly well with the Cobb-Douglas
case, i.e. σ = η = 1, which implies a constant labour share over the long run (see Case 1
in Table 3). Calibrated parameters for Denmark adopt a Cobb-Douglas technology for the
capital-skilled labour composite (η = 1) while keeping a value of 1.5 for σ. The intuition of
why these values imply a milder decline in the labour share is provided in Section 5.2 be-
low, with reference to the simulation exercise conducted with the dynamic version of the
model.
Note that while the value σ has been set for most countries at 1.5, the value of η
is country-specific. The value of η relative to σ, i.e. the extent to which capital is more
substitutive to unskilled than skilled labour, should reflect country-specific technological
features. In the literature, the aggregate elasticity of substitution has been broadly defined
as a measure of the efficiency of the productive system (e.g. de La Grandville, 1989). In
the vein of Hicks (1963), the value of η should capture the ease of inter-sectoral factors’ re-
allocation, which strongly depend on the sectoral elasticities of substitution. In an attempt
to investigate this hypothesis, we have used EU KLEMS data from 18 OECD countries23
covering the period 1970-2004 disaggregated by 9 main market industries24 to estimate the
relationship between the labour share and the capital-output ratio given by (9). We esti-
mate a fixed-effect model which allows for country, industry and time specific fixed effects.
The econometric evidence suggests that the capital-output ratios are significant, an indi-
cation that technological differences are a source of labour share movements. According
to these estimates, capital and skilled labour appear as highly substitutive (η > 1) in Agri-
culture, Electricity and Finance, and low substitutes (η < 1) in Manufacturing, Transport
and Communications, and Hotels and Restaurants. A unitary elasticity of substitution
(η = 1 , i.e. Cobb-Douglas technology) seems to prevail in Construction and Trade. Cal-
22 There are nevertheless a few countries (i.e., Belgium, Germany and Finland) where the capital-skilled labour
ratio has increased over time.
23 The sample includes Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France,
Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada
and Japan.
24 The sectoral breakdown adopts the one-digit level of the NACE classification, which includes 9 broadly-
defined industries, namely, Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing (A-B), Mining and Quarrying (C), Total
Manufacturing (D), Electricity, Gas and Water Supply (E), Construction (F), Wholesale and Retail Trade (G),
Hotels and Restaurants (H), Transport and Storage and Communication (I), Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and
Business Services (J-K).
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culating the weight in total value added25 of the sectors with η  1 yields the following
ranking of countries (from higher to lower weight of sectors with η  1): the United King-
dom, Denmark, France, Belgium, Italy, Germany, Spain, Austria and Finland. Although
this ranking generally supports the country-specific values chosen for η as summarised by
Table 4, it does not admittedly explain the case of France (which ranks high in terms of sec-
toral weights but is calibrated at η = 0.7) and Germany (which occupies an intermediate
to low position in terms of sectoral weights but is calibrated at η = 1.3).
In an attempt to go beyond the technological determinants of inter-sectoral factors’
substitution, Klump and Preissler (2000) emphasize the role of institutional factors. It is
argued that high levels of efficiency and the aggregate elasticity of substitution are as-
sociated with competitive labour markets, a high degree of openness and the presence
of institutions that favour the transfer of ideas among individuals and nations26. Thus,
in addition to the sectoral dimension discussed above, institutional arrangements should
contribute to rationalize the values for η reflected in Table 4. For instance, Spain is one
country characterized by a relatively low degree of market competition, comparatively
low degree of openness and poor innovation performance, which would all justify a low
value for η. Conversely, Denmark’s high value for η could be justified in light of high
levels of competition, openness and innovation.
Whereas the interaction between capital-augmenting technical progress, changes
in relative factor quantities and the elasticities of substitution play a key role in explain-
ing trends, the incorporation of intermediate inputs has the virtue of accommodating
medium-term swings, with changes in their relative price leading to a temporary change
in the same direction in the labour share.
Adjustment costs improve the fit of short- to medium-term labour share movements
in all countries except Austria and Belgium27, with labour hoarding being a major cause
of the relatively dampened and lagged response of employment to output. Empirical lit-
erature on adjustment costs for specific countries is scant 28. The few studies available in
25 This calculation is made on the basis of averages over the past decade.
26 Openness is thoroughly discussed in Ventura (1997), who has shown that a small country open to interna-
tional trade can be modelled as possessing a linear aggregate production function. More generally, globalisation
is claimed to increase the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the real wage (see OECD, 2007). On the
other hand, Weder and Grubel (1993) claim that industry-wide research associations can also cause high elastici-
ties of substitution, as they favour knowledge spillovers which result in new methods of production.
27 The best fit for Austria is obtained upon calibration of expression (8) (only technology). The preferred speci-
fication for Belgium is expression (13) (production function extended with intermediate inputs).
28 Hamermesh (1993a) summarises the stylised facts on employment dynamics: 1) The lag in adjusting employ-
ment demand is fairly short, with a half-life of perhaps three to six months; 2) Hours per worker are adjusted
more rapidly than employment, implying that costs of adjusting them are less than those of changing employ-
ment levels. Taken together this literature implies that adjustment costs for labour are not large. The few studies
that have tried to estimate their size directly on aggregate data confirm this conclusion, for they imply that the
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the literatue2930 point to the following classification of countries:
 Asymmetric adjustment costs with φ > 0 (i.e. the marginal cost of an increase in em-
ployment is greater than that of a reduction) can be postulated for the UK and Spain.
This is consistent with the evidence found by Messina and Vallanti (2006) who identify
these two countries as the only cases among EU15 economies where job reallocation
(i.e. the sum of job creation and job destruction) is counter-cyclical31. Blanchard and
Wolfers (2000) rationalize the Spanish case with reference to the development of fixed-
term contracts rather than the weakening of the protection of indefinite workers.
 Asymmetric adjustment costs with φ < 0 (i.e. the marginal cost of an increase in em-
ployment is lower than that of a reduction) seem to prevail in Italy and France. Em-
pirical works providing support for a slightly pro-cyclical pattern of job reallocation in
these two countries are Jaramillo et al. (1993) for Italy, Lagarde et al. (1994) for France
and Bentolila and Bertola (1990) for both Italy and France.
 Symmetric adjustment costs in employment (φ = 0) appear as a reasonable assumption
in the case of Germany, Denmark and Finland. Acyclical pattern in job reallocation is
found by Boeri and Cramer (1992) for Germany, and Messina and Vallanti (2006) for
Denmark and Finland.
The evolution of mark-ups over time helps explain declining labour shares in only
three countries, i.e. Finland, Spain and Germany. Oliveira et al. (1996) find that Finland
is the country with the highest increase in mark-ups for manufacturing sectors between
the 1970s and the 1980s. Spain and Germany are two countries where the shift in pro-
duction away frommanufacturing to market services has been the most dramatic, thereby
providing support to the McAdam and Willman’s sectoral shift hypothesis (op.cit). Fi-
per-period costs are not much more than one percent of the per-period payroll cost. The calibration exercise in
this section is consistent with these figures.
29 Some of the empirical studies quoted below in support of specific structures of adjustment costs refer to data
older than a decade ago. Although this is certainly a caveat of the calibration exercise presented in this section,
the assumption that employment protection has remained roughly stable since the 1970s can be adopted without
loss of accuracy. See Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) for a discussion on the biggest EU15 economies.
30 The studies quoted below are of three kinds: i) based on correlations between job reallocation and the output
gap; ii) based on macroeconomic estimations of the adjustment cost function; and iii) based on estimations of the
adjustment cost function at the micro level, most often focusing on manufacturing. Another strand of the liter-
ature has sought to estimate correlations between job reallocations and the strictness of Employment Protection
Legislation (EPL), with varying results depending on the study, which therefore do not allow for a classification
of countries. In this line, Garibaldi et al. (1997) find a negative correlation between job reallocation and the strict-
ness of EPL. On the contrary, similar correlations in OECD (1999) show a very weak negative association between
different indicators of the strictness of EPL and job turnover rates. This obviously stems from the fact that bar-
riers to the layoff of workers are expected to hinder both job creation and destruction, having ambiguous effects
on the average level of labour demand.
31 Note that although job creation is clearly pro-cyclical and job destruction is counter-cyclical, the volatility of
the two flows over the cycle may differ. Estimates for Anglo-Saxon countries and Spain suggest that the increase
in job destruction during economic downturns tends to be stronger than the increase in job creation during
upturns, resulting in counter-cyclical movements in job reallocation.
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Table 4   Country-Specific Parameter Values
Calibration on the basis of EU KLEMS data.
The period used for calibration slightly differs across countries (see footnote 18).
AT BE DE DK ES FI FR IT UK
LS preferred specification
Technology X X X X X X X X X
Intermediate inputs X X X X X
Mark-up X X X
Adjustment costs X X X X X X X
Elasticities of substitution
σ 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 1.5 1.5 1
η 0.4 0.7 1.3 1 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 1
λ 1.5 1.6 1 1.8 0.7 3 1.7 1.3 0.3
Product- and labour-market parameters
µ (*) (*) (*)
β 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
χ 2 2 0.5 2 1.5 1.5 0.5
φ 0 0 1 0 -1 -1 1
Source: Commission services.
(*): Evolution of mark-ups over time as in McAdam and Willman (2004b).
nally, the unskilled workers’ bargaining power does not provide any further explanatory
power to labour share movements. This result is in line with Bentolila and Saint Paul
(2003) who, based on econometric procedures, obtain a non-significant coefficient for the
variable meant to capture the bargaining power of workers32.
5.2 Model simulation
The previous section has shown that most of the declining pattern in labour shares in
nine EU15 Member States is governed by technological factors, namely, the interaction of
capital deepening, capital-augmenting technical progress and labour substitution across
skill categories. To illustrate the force of the technological explanation we use the dynamic
model developed in Section 4.2 to simulate the impact on the labour share of a permanent
reduction in the fraction of unskilled.
We focus on two countries, namely France and Denmark, which received quite sim-
ilar treatment in our calibration strategy (Table 4). We assume perfectly-competitive mar-
kets and thus abstract from any effects induced by changes in the mark-up, the bargaining
power or the adjustment costs. For simplicity, we also neglect the influence of changes in
the relative price of intermediate inputs. Our main aim is to show that, for a given increase
in the share of skilled workers, the reduction in the labour share crucially depends on the
32 As claimed by Bentolila and Saint Paul (2003) "(...) the straightforward interpretation would be that wage
bargains are not effcient, with the right-to-manage model, say, being a more appropriate description of reality".
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Figure 4: Observed and calibrated labour shares in selected EU15 Member
States. Calibration on the basis of EU KLEMS data. The period used for calibration
slightly differs across countries (see footnote 18).
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value of η. Note that, among the three input ratios which determine the labour share (see
expression (10) and accompanying paragraph), only the relative supply of skilled to un-
skilled labour can be regarded as genuinely exogenous. Once we decide upon its path,
both capital per skilled worker and capital per unskilled worker will result from capital
accumulation as standard in the neoclassical growth model.
The starting point of the simulation exercise is 2000, where it is assumed that both
economies are in transitional dynamics. Calibration was devised in such a way that the
only difference between the two countries is in the value of η, which is set to 1 in Denmark
and 0.6 in France (see Table 4)33.The annual rate of capital depreciation δ is equal to 4%. It
is assumed that labour-augmenting technical progress g stabilises at 1.1% in 2015 (starting
from around 1% in 1999), while the savings rate s and the population growth rate n only
reach their steady state levels in 2060, at respectively 19.3% and 0.1%. A hyperbolic con-
vergence path has been adopted between the initial values of s and n in 2000 and their
permanent levels in 2060. In both countries unskilled labour grows at a lower rate than to-
tal population in transitional dynamics, i.e. nu,t < nt, which yields a decreasing fraction
of unskilled labour over time, ut. Specifically, the conservative assumption made in the
simulated scenario is that there will be a 5% reduction in ut between 2000 and 2060. The
starting value for the level of labour-augmenting technical progress is calibrated to match
the value of effective income per capita in 2000.
The results are displayed in Figure 5. Given the initial position of both economies,
the calibrated values for fundamental parameters and the fraction of unskilled labour,
transitional dynamics are characterised by the accumulation of capital, with all the three
ratios KtNt ,
Kt
Ls,t and
Kt
Lu,t increasing over time. To interpret the impact on the labour shares re-
call that, given the properties of the production function, increases in both Ls,tLu,t and
Kt
Lu,t cause
a fall in the labour share; conversely, an increase in KtLs,t pushes the labour share upwards
over time (see Section 4.1). Our simulations indicate that the former two effects predom-
inate over the latter one, thereby implying a reduction in the labour share along the tran-
sition path. As indicated by the stability of the capital-output ratio, the two economies
reach the steady state by 2060. By that time, the labour share has declined by more than 10
percentage points in France34, against only 4 percentage points in Denmark.
33 Chosen values for δ, g, s, and n are consistent with the projection exercise elaborated by the Economic Pol-
icy Committee’s Ageing Working Group and the European Commission (2009). The Economic Policy Commit-
tee (EPC) gathers senior officials from national finance ministries and central banks and serves to prepare the
ECOFIN Council. The EPC’s Ageing Working Group was established to study the implications of ageing popu-
lations for public finances in areas such as pensions, health and education.
34 Although the order of magnitude of these results may surprise on the upside, they are strikingly similar to
their historical counterparts. Between 1980 and 2000 the share of the unskilled in total employment in France
dropped from 0.96 to 0.9, while the labour share fell from 0.70 to 0.58. Thus the percentage point reduction in the
labour share more or less doubled the percentage point reduction in the share of the unskilled.
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To interpret these results note that, according to expression (10), the labour share
can be expressed in terms of the proportion of skilled workers, the wage premium and
the unskilled workers’ labour share. Given that, by assumption, the p.p. reduction in
the fraction of unskilled workers is the same, any difference in labour share behaviour
between the two countries must arise from the remaining two variables. On the one hand,
an increase in the fraction of skilled labour Ls,tLu,t will create an excess supply of qualified
workers, which, for any given value of σ, will be more easily absorbed in the country with
a higher η. Thus, given KtLs,t and
Kt
Lu,t , the wage premium will fall by more in the country
where skilled labour is more complementary to capital, i.e. France. On the other hand,
capital accumulation implies that both KtLs,t and
Kt
Lu,t increase. As capital becomes relatively
abundant in terms of both categories of labour, relative factor prices rws and
r
wu both decline,
with opposing effects on the wage premium. For a given value of σ, the higher η (as in
Denmark) is, the less likely is that the wage premiummay increase. Our simulation results
suggest that the effect due to increased Ls,tLu,t is more powerful than the effect due to capital
accumulation, implying that the overall reduction in the wage premium is higher in the
economy where η is smaller, i.e. France.
The unskilled workers’ share is another element that enters in expression (10). Cap-
ital accumulation encourages the demand for skilled labour relatively more in the country
where qualified workers are more complementary to capital, which in turn results in a
lower level of unskilled employment and a sharper reduction in their income share in the
country where is η smaller (i.e. France).
6. Policy implications
Over the past three decades labour shares have declined in many European countries.
Building on previous literature in this field we have investigated this regularity along two
different routes. Firstly, analysing compositional shifts in a descriptive manner, we find
that, quite independently of wage moderation, the reduction in labour shares also reflects
an increasing weight of those sectors with structurally lower labour shares, together with
widespread reductions in the proportion of self-employment in total employment. This
suggests that wage-setting policies alone will not be sufficient to reverse the downward
trend in labour shares observed in Europe.
The second approach relies on a micro-founded model where the labour share is
seen as function of both technological and institutional parameters. The former are cap-
tured by factor substitution within the framework of a CES production function defined
in terms of capital, skilled and unskilled labour and intermediate inputs, with biased
(i.e. capital-augmenting) technical progress also playing a role in the medium term. In-
stitutional determinants include mark-ups, a measure of the bargaining power of un-
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Figure 5: Impact on the labour share of a 5 p.p. reduction in the proportion
of unskilled workers in the labour force.
Simulation results for France and Denmark on the basis of the dynamic model given
by expressions (30) to (33).
The upper panel shows the assumed paths for the exogenous variables, namely, the
depreciation rate, the population growth rate, the savings rate, the rate of techno-
logical progress and the fraction of unskilled labour. The middle and lower panels
show the paths for endogenous variables, namely, capital per capita, capital in terms
of skilled and unskilled labour, the capital-output ratio, income per capita and the
labour share.
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skilled workers and adjustment costs in employment. Our analysis suggests that most
of the decline in labour shares is explained by two technological forces, namely capital-
augmenting technical progress and the asssumption of capital-skill complementarity, i.e.
the fact that capital equipment is complementary to skilled labour but highly substitutive
to unskilled labour. Although institutional factors also play a significant role they appear
to be of somewhat less importance, explaining a relatively small fraction of the downward
movement in labour shares and accounting for only subdued short-term oscillations.
Our simulations point to the forceful implications of the nature of technological
progress given unchanged institutional settings. Not only has the labour share fallen over
the past three decades, but it may decline further in the future as a result of capital accu-
mulation and an increasing share of skilled labour in total employment. This conclusion
could be altered should technical progress be endogenized in the model. However, explor-
ing the complex interactions between the relative supply of skills, institutional settings in
labour and product markets and the nature of technological progress is well beyond the
scope of this paper.
Appendix 1: Measurement of the labour share
This appendix compares the three measures of the labour share given by expressions (1),
(2) and (3) presented in Section 2. We use EU KLEMS data of EU15 Member States cover-
ing the period 1970-2004. The sectoral breakdown used in the analysis includes 24 sectors
grouped into 9 broadly-defined industries (NACE code in brackets), namely, Agriculture,
Hunting, Forestry and Fishing (A-B), Mining and Quarrying (C), Total Manufacturing (D),
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply (E), Construction (F), Wholesale and Retail Trade (G),
Hotels and Restaurants (H), Transport and Storage and Communication (I), Finance, In-
surance, Real Estate and Business Services (J-K). Note that Community Social and Personal
Services (L-Q) are excluded, as value added generated by these sectors is merely wage and
salary income, so there is no genuine concept of labour share involved. In practical terms,
including NACE categories L-Q in the analysis would result in an upward bias of labour’s
income.
Figure 6 compares the three alternative measures of the labour share (1), (2) and (3).
Using (2) instead of (1) results in higher labour shares. This obviously stems from the fact
that part of the income earned by the self-employed is remuneration for labour services.
This adjustment generally preserves the dynamic patterns in labour shares35. The fraction
35 Readers should be aware of the fact that Austria has been excluded from the analysis. This is because the
imputation of labour income to the self-employed as implied by (2) results in an adjusted labour share exceeding
one. This is due to the fact that the correction implied by (2) is not very reliable when the wages for the two
types of employment largely differ, which is the case at stake. Specifically, in the case of Austria, equation
(2) largely overestimates the income of the self-employed in the 1970s, when these non-employee workers were
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of self-employment in total employment (mostly explained by the reduction of the share
of self-employed in agriculture) has decreased markedly in Greece, Ireland, France and
Spain. This is reflected in the convergence of the two series, (2) and (1), over time. The
UK stands out as the only country where the number of employees as a proportion of the
total workforce has actually shrunk, implying an increasing gap over time between non-
adjusted and adjusted labour shares. In the remaining EU15 countries, the structure of
employment in the whole economy has remained broadly stable.
The sectoral correction (i.e. computing labour shares according to (3) instead of (2))
does not change the picture in many EU15 members. Yet, it results in a substantial down-
ward revision of the labour share in several others, namely Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal,
and to a less extent, France and Ireland. Remunerating proprietors’ labour at the national
average compensation of wage earners tends to largely overestimate the labour share in
Greece, Spain and Italy at the beginning of the period, as most of the self-employed in the
1970s were farmers with low earnings.
Appendix 2: Derivation of the labour share under different theoretical
assumptions
This appendix shows basic analytical results regarding the specification of the labour share
under the various theoretical assumptions adopted in the main text.
Expressions (8) and (9)
Consider a specification for the production function with labour heterogeneity like
(5). The marginal productivity of skilled and unskilled labour is respectively given by:
Y0Ls = aBs (1  a) (BsLs)ρ 1 Y
1
σ

a (AK)ρ + (1  a) (BsLs)ρ
  1ε
Y0Lu = (1  α) Bu (BuLu) 
1
σ Y
1
σ
where ε = σρ
σ(ρ 1)+1 . Under perfect competition the skill premium (in efficiency
units) is:
mainly farmers with low earnings. In this country, the share of employees in total employment in the Agriculture
sector in 1970 was barely 6%, i.e. atypically low when compared with European standards. This measurement
problem tends to be less troublesome when calculating the adjusted labour share on the basis of sectoral data,
i.e. following expression (3) in the main text.
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Figure 6: Alternative measures of the labour share, EU15 Member States
excl. Austria. Comparison of expressions (1), (2) and (3) in the main text. EU
KLEMS data, 1970-2004.
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Under the assumption of perfect competition in the labour market, substitution of
the Y0L for wages in the expression for the labour share gives
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a (AK)ρ + (1  a) (BsLs)ρ
  1ε + (1  α) (BuLu) σ 1σ 
From the skill premium

a (AK)ρ + (1  a) (BsLs)ρ

=

α
1  α
ε
(1  a)ε (BsLs)(ρ 1)ε (BuLu)
ε
σ ω ε
Or
(BsLs)
ρ =
1
1  aω
 ε

α
1  α
ε
(1  a)ε (BsLs)(ρ 1)ε (BuLu)
ε
σ   a
1  a (AK)
ρ
The capital-output ratio is:

A
K
Y
 σ 1
σ
=
(AK)
σ 1
σ
α

a (AK)ρ + (1  a) (BsLs)ρ
 σ 1
ρσ + (1  α) (BuLu)
σ 1
σ
Solving the above expression for AK one gets:
AK = Ak (1  α)  ερ (BuLu)
n
αε (1  a)ε 1 l σ εσ ω1 ε + (1  α)ε
o σ
(σ 1)
Plugging AK into the expression for (BsLs)
ρ further above we find:
(BsLs)
ρ =

α
1  α
ε
(1  a)ε 1 (BsLs)(ρ 1)ε (BuLu)
ε
σ ω ε
  a
1  a

1
1  α
ε
(Ak)ρ (BuLu)
ρ
n
αε (1  a)ε 1 l σ εε ω1 ε + (1  α)ε
o σρ
σ 1
UNDERSTANDING LABOUR INCOME SHARE DYNAMICS IN EUROPE 41
which onemay substitute togetherwith the expression above for

a (AK)ρ + (1  a) (BsLs)ρ

into the labour share equation LSPC to obtain, after tedious calculations, expression (8):
LSPC = 1  a(1  a) (Ak)
ρ
n
αε (1  a)ε 1 + (1  α)ε l ε σσ ωε 1
o σρ
ε(σ 1)
Substituting the wage premium by its expression above and developing further, one
can get the labour share in terms of the three key ratios, k = AKY , l =
BsLs
BuLu , and
AK
BsLs as in
expression (9):
LSPC = 1  a (Ak)ρ α
σρ
σ 1
8><>:1+ 1  αα l 1 σσ

a

AK
BsLs
ρ
+ (1  a)
 1 σσρ 9>=>;
σ(ρ 1)+1
σ 1
Expression (13)
Consider a specification for gross output like (11). The first-order condition for
profit maximization with respect to intermediate inputs I is given by:
(1  γ)
 eY
I
! 1
λ
=
pIep
This condition can be solved for I, which yields I = (1  γ)λ
h
pIep
i λ eY. SubstitutingeY by (11) in the latter expression and working out I one gets
I =
h
αX
σ 1
σ + (1  α) (BuLu)
σ 1
σ
i σ
σ 1

1
γ(1 γ)λ 1
h
pIep
iλ 1   1 γγ  λλ 1
Recall that, according to equation (12), real value added is defined as:
Y = eY  pIep I
which can be rewritten as:
Y =
8<:γ
h
αX
σ 1
σ + (1  α) (BuLu)
σ 1
σ
i σ
σ 1
 λ 1
λ
+ (1  γ) I λ 1λ
9=;
λ
λ 1
  pIep I
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Substituting in the definition of value added given by the expression above gross
output eY worked out from the first-order condition for intermediate inputs, one can get:
Y = Ω
h
αX
σ 1
σ + (1  α) (BuLu)
σ 1
σ
i σ
σ 1
where Ω = γ
λ
λ 12641  (1 γ)λ
pIep
λ 1
375
1
λ 1
.
Define the labour share in value added under perfect competition as:
LSPC =
wPCu Lu + wPCs Ls
Y
=
Y0LuLu +Y
0
LsLs
Y
Following the same steps to find expression (8) one gets:
LSPC,I = 1 Ωa (Ak)ρ α
σρ
σ 1
8><>:1+ 1  αα l 1 σσ

a

AK
BsLs
ρ
+ (1  a)
 1 σσρ 9>=>;
σ(ρ 1)+1
σ 1
where LSPC,I is the labour share with firms operating under perfect competition and
facing changes in the relative price of intermediate inputs.
Expression (17)
The marginal productivity of unskilled and skilled labour are respectively given by:
Y0Ls = ΩaBs (1  a) (BsLs)ρ 1 Y
1
σ

a (AK)ρ + (1  a) (BsLs)ρ
  1ε
Y0Lu = Ω (1  α) Bu (BuLu) 
1
σ Y
1
σ
where Ω = γ
λ
λ 12641  (1 γ)λ
pIep
λ 1
375
1
λ 1
. In an imperfectly competitive setting, profit maximi-
sation by firms implies:
p = (1+ µ)mc = (1+ µ)
Wi
Y0L,i
, i = u, s
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whereWu,Ws respectively denote nominal wages for unskilled and skilled workers.
Rearranging terms:

Wi
p
IC
= wPCi =
Y
0
L,i
(1+ µ)
, i = u, s
Define the labour share in value added under imperfect competition as:
LSIC =
wICu Lu + wICs Ls
Y
where wICu , wICs respectively denote real wages for skilled and unskilled workers
under imperfect competition in the products market. Then substitute real wages for skilled
and unskilled workers by the respective marginal productivity of skilled and unskilled
labour corrected by the mark-up, thereby getting:
LSIC,I =
1
(1+ µ)
0BBB@1 Ωa (Ak)ρ α σρσ 1
8><>:1+ 1  αα l 1 σσ

a

AK
BsLs
ρ
+ (1  a)
 1 σσρ 9>=>;
σ(ρ 1)+1
σ 1
1CCCA
Appendix 3: Comparative static predictions of the labour share
Expression (9)
Consider the definition of the labour share given by expression (9) in the main text:
LSPC = 1  a (Ak)ρ α
σρ
σ 1
8><>:1+ 1  αα l 1 σσ

a

AK
BsLs
ρ
+ (1  a)
 1 σσρ 9>=>;
σ(ρ 1)+1
σ 1
The derivative of the labour share with respect to A is equal to:
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∂LSPC
∂A
=  aρAρ 1kρα σρσ 1
8><>:1+ 1  αα l 1 σσ

a

AK
BsLs
ρ
+ (1  a)
 1 σσρ 9>=>;
σ(ρ 1)+1
σ 1
 
 

σ (ρ  1) + 1
σ  1

a (Ak)ρ α
σρ
σ 1
8><>:1+ 1  αα l 1 σσ

a

AK
BsLs
ρ
+ (1  a)
 1 σσρ 9>=>;
σ(ρ 1)+1
σ 1  1
8><>:

1  σ
σρ

1  α
α
l
1 σ
σ

a

AK
BsLs
ρ
+ (1  a)
 1 σσρ  1
aρAρ 1

K
BsLs
ρ9>=>;
A sufficient condition for this derivative to be negative is that 1 < η < σ. If 1 < η
(ρ > 0), the first term of the derivative is negative. With capital-skill complementarity, i.e.
η < σ, the second term of the derivative is also negative.
Expression (10)
Consider the definition of the labour share given by expression (10) in the main text:
LSPC = θLu

1+
wPCs
wPCu
Ls
Lu

Let us reformulate the income share of unskilled workers and the wage ratio in
terms of relative factor quantities:
θLu =
1
1+ α1 α
h
a

AK
BuLu
ρ
+ (1  a) lρ
i σ 1σρ
wPCs
wPCu
=
Bs
Bu
α
1  α

a

AK
BsLs
ρ
+ (1  a)
  (ρ 1)ρ 
a

AK
BuLu
ρ
+ (1  a) lρ
  1σρ
The derivative of the labour share with respect to LsLu is:
∂LSPC
∂

Ls
Lu
 = ∂θLu
∂

Ls
Lu
 1+ wPCs
wPCu
Ls
Lu

+ θLu
264∂

wPCs
wPCu

∂

Ls
Lu
 Ls
Lu
+
wPCs
wPCu
375
If we now compute the derivates that enter the expression above, we find that:
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∂θLu
∂

Ls
Lu
 =   α1 α σ 1σρ
h
a

AK
BuLu
ρ
+ (1  a) lρ
i σ 1σρ  1
(1  a) ρ BsBu lρ 18<:1+ α1 α ha  AKBuLuρ + (1  a) lρi
σ 1
σρ
9=;
2 < 0 iff σ > 1
∂

wPCs
wPCu

∂

Ls
Lu
 =   Bs
Bu
α
1  α

a

AK
BsLs
ρ
+ (1  a)
  (ρ 1)ρ

1
σρ
 
a

AK
BuLu
ρ
+ (1  a) lρ
 ( 1σρ ) 1
(1  a) ρlρ 1 Bs
Bu
< 0, as 0 < σ < ∞.
Plugging the partial derivatives ∂θLu
∂( LsLu )
and
∂

wPCs
wPCu

∂( LsLu )
into ∂LSPC
∂( LsLu )
we get:
∂LSPC
∂

Ls
Lu
 = ∂θLu
∂

Ls
Lu

| {z }
( ) iff σ>1

1+
wPCs
wPCu
Ls
Lu

| {z }
(+)
+ θLu|{z}
(+)
26666664
∂

wPCs
wPCu

∂

Ls
Lu

| {z }
( )
Ls
Lu|{z}
(+)
+
wPCs
wPCu| {z }
(+)
37777775
Thus the sign of the above derivative remain ambiguous. Let us further show that
∂LSPC
∂( LsLu )
< 0 if σ > 1.To see this, it suffices to develop the second term in the expression for
the labour share LSPC = θLu + θLu
wPCs
wPCu
Ls
Lu , which yields:
LSPC = θLu + l
α
1 α
h
a

AK
BsLs
ρ
+ (1  a)
i  (ρ 1)ρ
1 α
α
h
a

AK
BuLu
ρ
+ (1  a) lρ
i 1
σρ
+
h
a

AK
BuLu
ρ
+ (1  a) lρ
i 1
ρ
If we now calculate the labour share with respect to LsLu , we get:
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∂LSPC
∂

Ls
Lu
 = ∂θLu
∂

Ls
Lu
 l α1 α
h
a

AK
BsLs
ρ
+ (1  a)
i  (ρ 1)ρ
1 α
α
h
a

AK
BuLu
ρ
+ (1  a) lρ
i 1
σρ
+
h
a

AK
BuLu
ρ
+ (1  a) lρ
i 1
ρ
 θLu
l α1 α
h
a

AK
BsLs
ρ
+ (1  a)
i  (ρ 1)ρ8>>><>>>:
1 α
α
1
σ
h
a

AK
BuLu
ρ
+ (1  a) lρ
i 1σρ 1
(1  a) ρ BsBu lρ 1+h
a

AK
BuLu
ρ
+ (1  a) lρ
i 1ρ 1
(1  a) BsBu lρ 1
9>>>=>>>;(
1 α
α
h
a

AK
BuLu
ρ
+ (1  a) lρ
i 1
σρ
+
h
a

AK
BuLu
ρ
+ (1  a) lρ
i 1
ρ
)2
The sign of the first term in the right-hand side is positive iff σ < 1 and negative iff
σ > 1.The second term in the right-hand side is always positive. Thus, the derivative of
the labour share with respect to the relative supply of skilled workers is negative if σ > 1.
The derivative of the labour share with respect to AKBuLu is:
∂LSPC
∂

AK
BuLu
 = ∂θLu
∂

AK
BuLu
 1+ wPCs
wPCu
Ls
Lu

+ θLu
264 ∂

wPCs
wPCu

∂

AK
BuLu
 Ls
Lu
375
If we now compute the derivates that enter the expression above, we find that:
∂θLu
∂

AK
BuLu
 =   α1 α σ 1σρ
h
a

AK
BuLu
ρ
+ (1  a) lρ
i σ 1σρ  1
aρ

AK
BuLu
ρ 1
8<:1+ α1 α ha  AKBuLuρ + (1  a) lρi
σ 1
σρ
9=;
2 < 0 iff σ > 1
∂

wPCs
wPCu

∂

AK
BuLu
 =   Bs
Bu
α
1  α

a

AK
BsLs
ρ
+ (1  a)
  (ρ 1)ρ
1
σρ

a

AK
BuLu
ρ
+ (1  a) lρ
  1σρ 1
aρ

AK
BuLu
ρ 1
< 0, as 0 < σ < ∞
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Plugging the partial derivatives ∂θLu
∂( AKBuLu )
and
∂

wPCs
wPCu

∂( AKBuLu )
into ∂LSPC
∂( AKBuLu )
we get:
∂LSPC
∂

AK
BuLu
 = ∂θLu
∂

AK
BuLu

| {z }
( ) iff σ>1

1+
wPCs
wPCu
Ls
Lu

| {z }
(+)
+ θLu|{z}
(+)
26666664
∂

wPCs
wPCu

∂

AK
BuLu

| {z }
( )
Ls
Lu|{z}
(+)
37777775
Thus ∂LSPC
∂( AKBuLu )
< 0 iff σ > 1.
The derivative of the labour share with respect to AKBsLs is:
∂LSPC
∂

AK
BsLs
 = ∂θLu
∂

AK
BsLs
 1+ wPCs
wPCu
Ls
Lu

+ θLu
264 ∂

wPCs
wPCu

∂

AK
BsLs
 Ls
Lu
375
If we now compute the derivatives that enter the expression above, we find that:
∂θLu
∂

AK
BsLs
 = 0
∂

wPCs
wPCu

∂

AK
BsLs
 =   Bs
Bu
α
1  α

a

AK
BuLu
ρ
+ (1  a) lρ
  1σρ
ρ  1
ρ

a

AK
BsLs
ρ
+ (1  a)
  ρ 1ρ  1
aρ

AK
BsLs
ρ 1
> 0 (< 0) i f ρ < 1 (ρ > 1) .
Thus ∂LSPC
∂( AKBsLs )
> 0 iff η > 0 which is always the case.
Expression (13)
Consider the definition of the labour share given by expression (9) in the main text:
LSPC,I = 1 Ωa (Ak)ρ α
σρ
σ 1
8><>:1+ 1  αα l 1 σσ

a

AK
BsLs
ρ
+ (1  a)
 1 σσρ 9>=>;
σ(ρ 1)+1
σ 1
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where Ω = γ
λ
λ 12641  (1 γ)λ
pIep
λ 1
375
1
λ 1
.
∂LSPC
∂

pIep
 =   Ω
∂

pIep
 a (Ak)ρ α σρσ 1
8><>:1+ 1  αα l 1 σσ

a

AK
BsLs
ρ
+ (1  a)
 1 σσρ 9>=>;
σ(ρ 1)+1
σ 1
∂LSPC,I
∂

pIep
 = γ λλ 1 (1  γ)λ 1
pIep
λ
2641  (1  γ)λ
pIep
λ 1
375
1
λ 1
a (Ak)ρ α
σρ
σ 1
8><>:1+ 1  αα l 1 σσ

a

AK
BsLs
ρ
+ (1  a)
 1 σσρ 9>=>;
σ(ρ 1)+1
σ 1
It then follows that ∂LSPC,I
∂

pIep
 > 0 iff
"
1  (1 γ)λ
pIep
λ 1
#
> 0, which is always the case. To
see this, recall that:
eY = Y+ pIep I
which implies that
I =
Y

pIep
 λ
(1  γ)λ"
1  (1 γ)λ
pIep
λ 1
#
thus, obviously
"
1  (1 γ)λ
pIep
λ 1
#
> 0 as I > 0.
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